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H.D. Westlake, <i>Studies in Thucydides and Greek History</i> . Bristol Classical Press, 1989. Pp.viii + 310. £9.95 Pbk.. ISBN 1-85399-041-8	

The Editorial Team has returned from Greece and Ithaki much refreshed, and the Editor had not realised how much he had missed a country which in the three years since his last visit has become noticeably more prosperous, partly due, he suspects, to EEC money but also to tourism. Nafplion in particular seems to have become the Greek equivalent of yuppified (?νέοι ανακινούμενοι) and the street containing the church of St. Spiridon (one of the few that contains an icon of St. Helena, of course with her son St Constantine) outside which Capodistrias was assassinated is now full of trendy restaurants and boutiques. But Argos and Thebes, though prosperous and the latter as full of *palikari* as Newcastle on a Saturday night, remain themselves, cities for which the Editor has always had an affection not shared by all English visitors to Greece, but by, he is happy to say, the other Editor, who shares also his tastes in tavernas, *istiatoria* and *retsina από βαρήλου*. The best *retsina* was found in Thebes, as the best feta in Ithaki, an island where an increased, but not oppressive number of tourists means that the Symposium on the *Odyssey* is no longer the chief entertainment of September as which it used to be advertised. But readers will be glad to know that at 89 Professor J. Kakridis continues in excellent health.

Devotees of Hesiod will also be pleased to hear that the heirs of Aik. Liberis of Askre Thebon (tel. [0262] 67219 - 67243 are producing and bottling an *οίνος λευκός ξηρός επιτραπέζιος από την φημισμένη περιοχή των 9 Μουσών*, which they appropriately call ELIKON. On the bottle there is a second label on which Kyrios D. Liberis quotes Hesiod and describes his wine in words which the Editor proposes to reproduce in their entirety.

«Κι' ως τα μεσούρανα ανεβούν ο Σείριος κι' ο Ωρίων, κι' η Ροδοδάχτυλη η  
 Λυγή θωρήσει τον Αρκτούρο, τότε τρυγάς και πας στο σπίτι τα σταφύλια.  
 Δεκα μερόνυκτα άφησ' τα στον ήλιο, κι' άλλα πέντα βάλ τα σε τόπο  
 ισκιερό, κι' από στην έκτη μέρα του γλεντοκόπου Διόνυσου τα δώρα  
 τραβήξέτα στ' αγγειά σου . . . . .» ΣΤΙΧΟΣ 610 «ΕΡΓΑ ΚΑΙ ΗΜΕΡΑΙ»  
 ΗΣΙΟΔΟΥ ΕΤΟΣ 800 π.Χ ΑΣΚΡΑ-ΒΟΙΩΤΙΑ

After this Kyrios Liberis goes on to describe and recommend his wine.

Στα σκιερὰ ἄλση και τις εἰδυλλιακές κοιλάδες του Ελικώνα κοντά στην Ἀσκηρὴ τῆς Θήβας που παράγεται κρασί εδώ και 3.000 χρόνια με παραδοσιακό τρόπο, προσπαθήσαμε και αξιοποιήσαμε με την πιο σύγχρονη τεχνολογία και την οικονομική βοήθεια τῆς ΕΟΚ αυτό το θείο δῶρο «Το Κρασί των Θεῶν». Σας το προσφέρουμε με τις ονομασίες.

ΗΣΙΟΔΟΣ - ΤΕΡΨΙΧΟΡΗ - AMADEUS

Δοκιμάστε τα ...

From which the Editor sees that he was right about the role of the EEC in the prosperity of Greece. As for the wine, he can say that it is truly Hesiodic, honest and unexciting, virtues by no means possessed by all wines of any country. *LCM* has no plans to import and market the wine, but he wishes Kyrios Liberis good luck with it, and may see if he can find an importer.

The team's visit to Ithaki was preceded by a tour of the Mycenaean sites of the Peloponnese by car, the terrors of Greek driving being greatly exaggerated, except for Athens, and he does not recommend the attempt to find the East terminal of the Airport by night. To stay the night at Mycenae in the Belle Helène is pleasant and enables the site, which is clearly now a kind of shrine attracting pilgrims, to be visited in the cool of the morning, and in the evening homage was paid to the grave of Humphry Payne. The Nafplion Museum is still one of the most pleasant, but the Editor wishes that the German Archaeological Institute and the Greek Archaeological Service might combine to tidy up and label the site at Tiryns.

But it is time to apologise for the guide-book appearance that these notes are assuming, and to return to the realities of English academic life, where he finds that more and more Universities are being forced into deficits for which they are then blamed by the very organisations that have caused them. He recalls many years ago hearing an industrialist at a Degree ceremony tell us that the cuts would be bracing and that we must welcome them, but in fact their effect on the conduct of the academic life has not been good and those who will have to try and cope with the changed climate have, from the sidelines, his sympathy.

Among them are his colleagues Professor J.K.Davies, Dr. C.J.Tuplin and Dr C.Mee, respectively the heads of the new School of Archaeological, Classical and Oriental Studies (SACOS) and its two Departments, Classics & Ancient History and Archaeology, the latter of which has taken into itself the previous Institute of Prehistoric Archaeology, the School of Oriental Studies (which in the Liverpool context has meant Egyptology, Hebrew, Akkadian etc.) and a number of archaeologists from Extension Studies. The Editor is particularly happy in this issue to be publishing a scholarly review by Dr Tuplin, and he hopes that the burdens of administration will not, as too often they do, interfere with his continued production of such and other articles whether for *LCM* or elsewhere.

He asks those readers who have not by now begun to regret the curtailed notes of the past few issues to note the change of address, easily made on the computer, but the Editor supposes he will have to get yet another rubber stamp for the envelopes. Such changes often incur more expense than they save. Nonetheless, although postage is going up 2p this month in UK and inflation running at over 10% officially and surely more in fact, he is happy to announce that the subscription will be held at the present rates for 1991, though he is unable to make any promises for 1992.

The Editor returns, as these notes suggest, with restored rather than renewed vigour, having recovered from the trauma of the act of retirement and now actively looking forward to devoting it to *LCM* and, if possible, to some original research on Homer and Livy.

The Dinosaur too, as one correspondent hoped would be the case, is enlarged rather than merely restored to the previous size.



Both fragments of and *testimonia* to the Presocratic philosophers are normally sought in authors from Plato to Simplicius, with anything later being regarded as a 'rare case'.<sup>1</sup> By and large this is true, but that should not deter students of ancient philosophy from fossicking in Byzantine texts for nuggets big or small. In this little note, I take Parmenides by way of example. No major Byzantine work on him has yet been detected<sup>2</sup> — 'yet', we may hope, is the operative word. But there are at least three small items of some interest that do not (for easy and convenient example) feature in the recent editions of Parmenides by Coxon, Gallop, and Tarán,<sup>3</sup> in part perhaps because they are also absent from Diels-Kranz.

In *Parasite* 28, Lucian, in the course of a characteristically scornful résumé of philosophical theories, makes one of his interlocutors say (in Harmon's Loeb rendition), 'Well now, philosophy is not one, for I see that it is infinitely many; yet it cannot be many, for wisdom is one.' This evoked from some of Lucian's scholiasts<sup>4</sup> the comment that the satirist is here ridiculing Anaxagoras and Parmenides *οἵτινες ἔλεγον ἐν τῷ ὄν καὶ ἀπειρον*, adding subsequently that these authors were *φυσικούς*<sup>5</sup> rather than *θεολόγους* in terms of the books they wrote. These scholia<sup>6</sup> are found in the 13th century ms. *Vat. graec.* 89 and in the 14th century and later sections of *Laurentianus conv. suppr.* 77. Since Lucian does not mention Parmenides by name here or indeed anywhere else, it is significant that these late commentators were capable of recognising him as the butt. Also notable is their use of the phrase (not Lucian's) *ἐν τῷ ὄν* since Parmenides<sup>7</sup> only uses the word 'one' in connection with Being in frag. 8.6 (quoted in full by Simplicius).

That versatile 12th century man of letters Theodore Prodromus, enumerating in one of his letters<sup>8</sup> the great names of pagan Greek philosophy, states that 'Xenophanes of Colophon taught Eleatic philosophy to Parmenides.' This (of course) is not new information, but is worth noticing as a late Byzantine reiteration of a claim usually denied by modern commentators<sup>9</sup> who tend to see it as Aristotle's misunderstanding (*Met.* 986b22) of the remark by Plato (*Soph.* 242d) that 'the Eleatic sect began with Xenophanes and even earlier.' But as Guthrie,<sup>10</sup> a rare believer, points out, Plato does not actually specify the relationship, nor (it may be added) mention Parmenides by name in the crucial sentence. To what extent Parmenides reflects the views of Xenophanes is debatable, but a pupil was not bound to follow an old master's teachings throughout his own work.<sup>11</sup> On a less serious note, we can observe the *Suda*'s adducing (E 1002

<sup>1</sup> The words of Kirk & Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (3rd ed., rev. M. Schofield, Cambridge 1983, 1, adducing only John Tzetzes. Cf. 1-7 for their general survey; they might have singled out the *Suda*, derivative as it is, as something of a special case also.

<sup>2</sup> For easy and pertinent instance, he is not in the index of ancient authors in N.G. Wilson, *Scholars of Byzantium* (London 1983), where of the philosophers discussed by Kirk & Raven, only pseudo-Pythagoras and pseudo-Democritus occur.

<sup>3</sup> A.H. Coxon, *The Fragments of Parmenides* (Assen/Maastricht 1986), along with M. Schofield's review in *Phronesis* 32 (1987), 349-66; D. Gallop, *Parmenides of Elea* (Toronto 1984); L. Tarán, *Parmenides* (Princeton 1965).

<sup>4</sup> Text in the Teubner (Leipzig 1906; repr. Stuttgart 1971) edition of H. Rabe, *Scholia in Lucianum*, 158, 1-14.

<sup>5</sup> Thus helping to confirm the title of Parmenides' poem as *περὶ φύσεως*. Parmenides is also *φυσικός* in *Anon. Byz.* p. 52, 19 Treu (=DK 28 A 40). I am not dissuaded by Coxon 156 who argues that this cannot have been Parmenides' original title; amongst other things, he ignores the statement of Diogenes Laertius 8.55 where Empedocles is said on the authority of Theophrastus to have been influenced in his verses by Parmenides who also wrote a poem entitled *περὶ φύσεως*.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Rabe iv-v for details.

<sup>7</sup> According to Coxon 196.

<sup>8</sup> *Ep.* 7, Migne, *PG* 133.1261.

<sup>9</sup> See (e.g.) Coxon 38; Gallop 3; Kirk & Raven 165-6, 240-1; Tarán 3.

<sup>10</sup> W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* II (Cambridge 1965), 2 n.4.

<sup>11</sup> As Diogenes Laertius put it, 'Parmenides, however, though instructed by Xenophanes, was no follower of him.' (9.21 = DK 28 A 1).

Adler) of Porphyry's *History of Philosophy* for the claim that Empedocles was the catamite of Parmenides, a variant on both the theme of Empedoclean admiration for Parmenides and on that of Zeno as Parmenides' pretty boy.<sup>12</sup> Albeit not of much consequence, we can add the *Suda*'s mention in the long notice of Adam (A 425 Adler) in a list of Greek philosophers of 'the Parmenides', the Protagoras', and the Zenos.'

Another product of 12th century Byzantium was the anonymous satire *Timarion*,<sup>13</sup> much of which comports a comic catabasis into the underworld in the manner of Lucian. At ch.43, the narrator reports that one of the sights he saw in Hades was that of 'Parmenides, Pythagoras, Melissus, Anaxagoras, Thales, and the other founders of the philosophical schools sitting quietly together and discussing their respective beliefs very calmly and unemotionally.' The fact that Parmenides' name<sup>14</sup> comes first in the list might betoken some particular admiration of him,, either on the author's part or more widely in Byzantine philosophical salons; at any rate, his pre-eminence in the sentence owes nothing to alphabet or chronology. It can be subjoined that, although there are no precise linguistic concordances and the description owes much to Lucian (in turn following details that go back through Plato to Homer<sup>15</sup>), *Timarion*'s account (chs.14ff.) of his descent into Hades, its strong gates, and the emergence from darkness into light is generally reminiscent of Parmenides' first fragment (preserved by Sextus Empiricus and Simplicius) with its celebrated narrative of the poet's chariot ride to meet his goddess. Homeric pastiche is another common feature.<sup>16</sup> Whilst there is obviously no need or justification for insisting that the author of the *Timarion* must have read Parmenides' verses, they might have been known to him from the narrator's teacher Theodore of Smyrna who was in real life the author of as yet unpublished commentaries on the physical theories of Aristotle,<sup>17</sup> or from other teachers and commentators. It is likewise possible that Lucian was aware of Parmenides' account, despite his failure to name him or include him in (e.g.) his *Philosophies for Sale*; this would provide another small but not inconsequential link in the transmission of Parmenides' text and reputation throughout the Roman and Byzantine periods.

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<sup>12</sup> Gallop 105-8 appears to have missed this item, though he has the others; it is in Coxon 128 and in DK 31 A 2 (under the rubric of Empedocles).

<sup>13</sup> Edited by R.Romano (Naples 1974) and most recently by M.D.Macleod in vol.4 of his *OCT* of Lucian (1987); see also the annotated translation of B.Baldwin (Detroit 1984).

<sup>14</sup> Which occurs in the accusative case in (as reported by Romano) the unique ms. *Vat. graec.* 87 in the unusual form Παρμενίδα, altered to Παρμενιδην by Ellissen. Macleod, however, describes the ms. reading as 'fortasse Παρμενιδη', attributing Παρμενίδα to Hase, himself suggesting (though not printing) Παρμενιδαν. The aforementioned scholiasts on Lucian have Παρμενιδην.

<sup>15</sup> See the notes in Romano and Baldwin (n.13 above) for specific details and traceable sources.

<sup>16</sup> Of Parmenides' modern editors, Coxon 7-9 brings out this best.

<sup>17</sup> See H.Hunger, *Die Hochsprachliche Profane Literatur der Byzantiner* I (Munich 1978), 51; see also R.Browning, 'A new Source on Byzantine-Hungarian relations', *Balkan Studies* 2 (1961), 181, repr. in the author's *Studies on Byzantine History, Literature and Education* (London 1977).

δυρόμενοι δὲ γέροντες τὸ πᾶν δὴ κλύουσιν ἄλγος

'κλύουσιν is certainly odd'; so H.D.Broadhead, *The Persae of Aeschylus* (Cambridge 1960), 1534. After *δυρόμενοι* one expects a word such as 'express', especially after *πενθεῖ* v.579. This supposition is strongly supported by the strophe (568ff.). Whatever is supplied in v.571, clearly it corresponds in meaning (closely or otherwise) with *σκύλλονται* in 577. Similarly, *στένε* in 571 is answered by *πενθεῖ* 579, *οὐράνι' ἄχη* 574 by *δαιμόνι' ἄχη* 581. One expects therefore a word signifying audible grief in v.584 to correspond to *τεῖνε δυσβάγκτον βοᾶτιν τάλαιναν αὐδάν*. The simplest change is to read *δὴ κλύουσιν* with prodelision: 'mourning the old men unleash their full anguish'. For the sense we may compare *ἐκλύσων στόμα* at Soph. *Ai.*1225. The epic scansion of the verb need not surprise in *Persai*; we may compare the synzezeis of *κύνεον* in v.81, similarly unparalleled in tragedy. See also Broadhead's note on v.424.

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The poem of Philodemus in question is AP 5.132 = Gow/Page, *Garland of Philip* xii.

ὦ ποδός, ὦ κνήμης, ὦ τῶν ἀπόλωλα δικαίως  
μυρῶν, ὦ γλουτῶν, ὦ κτενός, ὦ λαγόνων,  
ὦ ὤμοι, ὦ μαστῶν, ὦ τοῦ ραδινοῖο τραχήλου,  
ὦ χειρῶν, ὦ τῶν μαίνομαι ὀμματίων,  
ὦ κατατεχνοτάτου κινήματος, ὦ περιάλλων  
γλωττισμῶν, ὦ τῶν θῦέ με φωναρίων·  
εἰ δ' Ὀπικὴ καὶ Φλώρα καὶ οὐκ ἄδουσα τὰ Σαπφούς,  
καὶ Περσεὺς Ἰνδῆς ἤρασατ' Ἀνδρομέδης.

It is well-known that this served as the basis for Ovid *Amores* 1.5.19-22

quos umeros, quales vidi tetigique lacertos!  
forma papillarum quam fuit apta premi!  
quam castigato planus sub pectore venter!  
quantum et quale latus! quam iuvenale femur!

and that Ovid in his words (25) *cetera quis nescit?* has combined this with a reminiscence of Philodemus AP 5.4.8 = G/P i 6 ἤδη τῆς Παφίης ἴσθι τὰ λειπόμμενα and Argentarius AP 5.128 = G/P xiii 3 *χρῶτα λαβὼν πρὸς χρῶτα τὰ λοιπὰ | σιγῇ* (unless Argentarius is imitating Ovid).

However, Philodemus xii impinges on Ovid elsewhere too. I shall now first list some passages on which my discussion will be based, then I shall diagrammatically indicate the relationship which I see between those passages, and finally I shall try to corroborate the stemma of influences.

Asclepiades AP 5.210 = Gow/Page *Hellenistic Epigrams* v 3

εἰ δὲ μέλαινα, τί τοῦτο; καὶ ἄνθρακες.

Theocritus 10.28

καὶ τὸ ἶον μέλαν ἐστὶ καὶ ἄγραπτὰ ὑάκινθος.

Vergil *Buc.* 10.38-9

quid tum, si fuscus Amyntas?

et nigrae violae sunt et vaccinia nigra.

Ovid (?) *Epistula Sapphus* 35-6

candida si non sum, pacuit Cepheia Perseo

Andromede, patriae fusca colore suae.

Ovid *AA* 1.53

Andromedan Perseus nigris portarit ab Indis


2.643-4

nec suus Andromedae color est oblectus ab illo

mobilis in gemino cui pede pinna fuit.

## STEMMA

Key: A) topos of foreign girl B) topos of dark complexion C) topos of Perseus and Andromeda;  
C\*) Andromeda Indian D) particular formulation of topos analysed below E) Sappho



Some things not noted in the stemma deserve a few words. First, it is that Asclepiades depends on Theocritus (not the other way round, since Theocritus derives the wording of the context generally [see Gow on 27] from Plato *Rep.* 5.474d). Second, Theocritus does not exemplify D, but he does approach it. Third, Ovid AA 1.53 does call the Indians 'dark', but the epithet has no contextual function, so I do not claim this as B. Finally, one must in general wonder in a stemma like this whether we still have all the links; in this case I see no firm reason to suppose that any are missing.

With the mention of Perseus and Andromeda Philodemus, as Gow and Page say, 'is thinking of outlandish origin rather than colour', but he has taken from Asclepiades, who is thinking of colour, the formal structure in which an objection to a girl is put in a conditional clause with concessive force, and is then refuted by a contrary *exemplum* introduced by *et* or *καί*, 'too' (of course one cannot be sure of the exact sense of the first *καί* in Theocritus, who, as pointed out above, does approach D).

This *et* is missing in the passage of the letter of Sappho to Phaon usually printed as the fifteenth of the *Heroides* because, as C.E. Murgia (to whom I am indebted for acute and thoughtful comments) points out, the formulation is here employed to argue that Phaon should love Sappho though he does not, whereas Asclepiades, Philodemus and Vergil use it to justify an already existing infatuation; a dark-complexioned girl has not pleased both Phaon and Perseus. The writer of *Ep. Sapphus* has taken the passage of Philodemus and adapted it to complexion in the wake of Vergil (who himself, as the diagram indicates, has built on a combination of Theocritus and Asclepiades).

AA 1.53 is in a context in which the point is geographical remoteness, as in Philodemus, but it has a subordinate reference to colour; as pointed out above, this is not such as to justify a line from *Ep. Sapphus* to AA 1.53 on my stemma. However, a reference to colour is central to AA 2.643-4. This reference is most naturally explained as coming from the *Epistula Sapphus*, the writer of which got the idea of introducing Perseus and Andromeda from Philodemus, where they are immediately preceded by a reference to Sappho.

The conclusion that a passage in the *Ars Amatoria* derives its formulation from that in the letter to Sappho would seem to be an argument in favour of the genuineness of that letter. It is undeniable that some (by no means all) of Tarrant's arguments (*HCSP* 85 [1981], 133) against the genuineness of the letter have force, but I imagine that my claim that Ovid in the AA drew on the letter would be unwelcome to those who regard it as spurious, and I think that this argument should be taken into account on the other side. The argument gains strength from the improbability that one eight-line epigram by Philodemus should have furnished material both to Ovid (*Amores* and AA) and (on the assumption that the letter of Sappho is not genuine) to an imitator of Ovid; it is much more likely that Ovid, having used the poem in his *Amores*, had it hanging in his mind when he came to write the *Heroides* and the AA.

**John Dillon** (Trinity College, Dublin): *Why an Axe?*  
*A note on Aristotle, De Anima II 1, 412b10ff.*

LCM 15.8 (Oct.1990), 119-120

As is well known to all interested parties, Aristotle, when striving to make clear the meaning of his revolutionary definition of the soul at the beginning of Book II of the *De Anima*, produces, as an illustration of what he means by the soul's being the *τὴν ἔλναι* of a body which has life, the comparison of an axe; 'Suppose', he says, 'that an instrument, such as an axe, were a natural body, then its substance (*οὐσία*) would be what it is to be an axe, and this would be its soul; if this were removed it would no longer be an axe, except homonymously. But as it is, it is an axe.'

Various commentators down the ages have commented on the oddness of this comparison – after all, as Aristotle himself remarks just after this passage (412b16-18), an axe is an inanimate object, and thus not at first sight the best sort of thing with which to compare a living creature – but no one, so far as I can observe, either ancient or modern<sup>1</sup>, has made any suggestion as to why Aristotle should have chosen it (if some old German has anticipated me here, I beg his pardon; my investigations have been far from exhaustive).

For a philosophical commentator like D.W.Hamlyn<sup>2</sup>, for instance, the choice of example is adequately explained by Aristotle's concentration here on the aspect of *function*:

Aristotle's selection of a tool, an axe, to provide an analogy with the ensouled body reveals how close to the surface in this discussion is the notion of *function*. The substance or essence of an axe is its function, without which it would not be an axe. Like the Greeks in general, Aristotle had no difficulty in thinking of a natural body as having a function too; . . . this is part of his general teleology. But, as he goes on to point out, there are differences also between an axe and a natural body, which spoil the analogy. This is the force of the words 'But as it is, it is an axe' – the essence of an axe is not its soul, since it does not have one, not being a living thing.' (*op. cit.* p.86.)

All this is perfectly sound, and I have no quarrel with it. But I still think it appropriate to raise the question, 'Why an axe?' – as opposed to, say, a wheelbarrow, or a pruning hook, or a wine-ladle.

I raise this question because an answer to it struck me forcibly not long ago while re-reading the *Iliad*, an activity which is a joy in itself, but which, I find, always brings new and curious things to light as well. At the beginning of Book III, a passage well known to every Greek schoolboy, Hector has occasion to abuse his brother Paris for slinking back cravenly into the ranks when confronted with Menelaus. Paris accepts the rebuke peacably, in the following words: Ἐκτορ, ἐπεὶ με κατ' αἶσαν ἐνείκεσας οὐδ' ὑπὲρ αἶσαν, —

αἰεὶ τοι κραδίη πέλεκυς ὥς ἐστιν ἀπειρής,  
 ὅς τ' εἰσιν διὰ δουρὸς ὑπ' ἀνέρος, ὅς ῥά τε τέχνη  
 νῆϊον ἐκτάμνησιν, ὀφέλλει δ' ἀνδρὸς ἐρωήν·  
 ὥς σοὶ ἐνὶ στήθεσσι νόος ἐστί· —

Hector, seeing you have scolded me rightly, not beyond measure –  
 still your heart is weariless, like an axe blade

driven by a man's strength through the timber, one who, well skilled,  
 hews a piece for a ship, driven on by the force of a man's strength:

such is your heart in your breast, unshakable – Tr. Lattimore.

Hector's *κραδίη*, then, is like a *πέλεκυς*, the characteristic of which is cutting. This is a

<sup>1</sup> None of the commentators— Alexander, Themistius, Simplicius, Philoponus, Sophonias – adverts to the possible reason for Aristotle selecting precisely this example. No doubt it would have seemed to them a point of no significance, even if it had occurred to them.

<sup>2</sup> *Aristotle's De Anima, Books I and II*, trans., with intro. and notes. Clarendon Aristotle Series, Oxford 1968. Sir David Ross, we may note, in his commentary (*Aristotle, De Anima*, Oxford 1961, p.214) sees nothing odd in the axe comparison; nor yet does Gaston Rodier, in his very full commentary (*Aristote, Traité de l' Ame*, Paris, 1900, Tome II, 181-3).

rather striking comparison which Homer puts into the mouth of Paris, and it is the sort of thing that would stick in the mind of any well-educated Greek. Not only to Aristotle, I think, but to any of his audience, the comparison of soul with axe would ring a bell, as of course it still should with us. Indeed, I am rather embarrassed not to have noted it before this.<sup>3</sup>

It must be admitted, of course, that no great philosophical question hangs on this point.. All I think it achieves (if it be accepted) is to remind us how thoroughly imbued the mind of an educated Greek, whether a native of Athens or of Stagira, was with the Homeric poems, and to perhaps excuse Aristotle to some extent for producing a rather odd comparison.

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John Henderson (King's College, Cambridge): *Livy and the Inventory of History ('Periocha')*

LCM 15.8 (Oct 1990), 120-121

The essay *Livy and the Invention of History* for a recent collection (Averil Cameron (ed.) *History as Text*, 1989) appears without its — I should have thought obligatory — 'Epitome', namely fig. 1: 'Ways of Sawing'. These photographic images are supposed to oscillate, to have oscillated, ('see/saw') through their juxtaposition, they are meant to figure undecidable — snappily polar — tension in reading texts. In the case of Livy, the point would be to stress that if we approach Livy's writings as the vestiges of a 'composition', we will find that what we know of his work leaves us with, not just the usual considerations of how to delimit a 'context' as a frame within which to comprehend his work (literary, generic, historiographic, historical, cultural ..), but the irreducible surplus of meaning (represented by the 'extra piece of the jigsaw') that his writing's trajectory through the moment when he first began to write imposes on any notion we impose upon Livian 'composition'. This text was not written without (i.e. 'outside') a poetic of some kind, yet in an important sense this authorial 'design' must be seen as necessarily shifting, always awaiting definition, indefinite and over-determined. And the point would be to stress, equally, that this writing of Livy is itself a discursive phenomenon active upon and responsive to the scenes of its production and reception. The text was not written and is never read without the insistent dimension of a politics of reading, of some kind. I hope that the pictorial double-take begins to suggest — *this side of* assertion — a proliferation of further 'ways' to bring Livy into focus.

The main point of this note, however, is to make explicit what I take to be the chief consideration the essay means to underline — above any of the (I hope scholarly) unpicking of the scholarship that goes on in its course and certainly before delivering any (howsoever playful) threat of a 'dead end' to the professional expertise of the academic world. What I call at one point the 'monu-mentality' of Livy is what I hope will re-appear to the view of scholarship. Hence the essay's repeated nods toward Epic, Proust, Joyce, etc.; and hence the labelling of History's '*millesima pagina* Complex'. It doesn't seem to me that mastery of Livy's writing is conceivable in the light of the story it tells of a life spent in its writing (— Any more than we would want to narrate Ancient History at Oxford, by deciding between Last and Syme, as the dinosaur might perhaps put it —). Similarly, the notion that a 'single' synopsis of 'Augustus' is either desirable or attainable seems to me to be the historical lesson of the writing of Livy's history. The recommendation I try to make, then explore *a little*, is that we regard Livy's work and its 'Augustan Age' precisely as the nascence of a comprehensive panopticism. What Nicolet has labelled *L'Inventaire*, the discovery and imposition of order, a 'willed-wilful imposition', upon a domain conceived as the non-finite cultural expanse of a World-Empire,

<sup>3</sup> Professor George Huxley, to whom I am indebted for a number of useful comments, points out to me that in the Homeric passage the *κραδίη* or *νόος* in general is not being compared to an axe, but only that of Hector. I quite agree, but regard that as not a serious difficulty. All that Aristotle is borrowing from Homer is the bare notion of someone's heart or mind being compared to an axe.

takes shape, is articulated around, a mass of representations that includes the *Aeneid*, the Forum Augustum ensemble, 'Agrippa's map', and not least *Livy*. Beyond anything specifically said 'in' and 'on' these representations, their significance lies in their comprehensiveness, the conceptual universality of their purview. What the *Res Gestae* could assert by their iterability, the possibility of their ubiquity, is not to be missed when its other, matching, side manifests itself in the boundless range of the Ovidian corpus, the Other of Augustus. What the *Fasti* and the *Fasti* enact for the systematising of Time, Horace's lyrics (Esp. the epilogue 'meta-texts' *Carm.* 2 20, 3 30 and the grandly performative *Carm. Saec.*) work into a perspective for any participant in imperial culture to share, the mind-set for anywhere, any time. It is the scale of the vision, its all-inclusiveness, that calls for attention.

And, to be sure, the process of its formulation. To think back to the subjection of Livy's writing — his *life's work* — to all the uncertainties, the revisions and the never-ending series of decisions it embodies in its structuring, its values, its self-conception, is to open up his text to the scenes of its reading. It can no more hope to envisage these than an Emperor could grasp the reception he was getting and to get from his various citizens (and from us). From a certain point of view, namely on high, the *Inventory* aspires, true enough, to be its own power over meaning; but power can never dictate meaning, it is necessarily at risk in all of its enabling representations. In the case of a historian's writings, narrative form itself predestines their work to a contested passage toward final resolution, liable to derailment *passim* through their mimetic stories of dissension, transgression, struggle for power and contestation of history. A would-be 'total' history such as Livy's is, as well, shot through with actual incompleteness; its power to mean is overtaken by an array of pluralities. All this holds, too, at the higher level of the aggregate of Augustan representations.

In some sense, then, it is Livy's *performance* of his 'definitive' role, not what he wrote, that 'matters'. But, then again, what he wrote contests exactly this 'imperial' proposition.




Fig. 1 *Ways of Sawing*. Here is the Scissors-and-Paste-Board of History: the *extra piece* in formalist and historicist aspects, the stereography of compositional art ~ the insistence of documentary interrogation; The Photograph ~ The Polaroid; narrative ~ analysis. The JGWHsaw.

John Creed died in Lancaster on May 5th 1990 at the age of 62. He had been ill for nearly two years; but had only stopped going in to the University in January. To the end he was working at home, courageously speaking of recovery and return, still marking essays from the course he taught up to Christmas.

His earliest years were spent in the cathedral close at Ely, where his father, Ely Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, was a canon. He learned Classics at Marlborough College and St John's College, Cambridge. A life-long sufferer from asthma, he was not liable for military service, and he took his degree at Cambridge from 1946 to 1950, choosing the difficult option of taking two years over Part II of the Tripos and offering two 'Groups', both Philosophy and History. From there he went to the University of Reading as Lecturer in Classics at the age of 22, and stayed there fifteen years. The Classics Department at Reading at that period was something of a fiefdom of St John's, with a powerful succession of characters among the lecturers, including John Crook, Jack Charlton, Deryk Williams, John Creed, Alan Wardman, Fred Robertson. Sadly, the central four of those have died in the last few years.

In 1964 the new University opened at Lancaster, and in its second year Classics was added, to complete the original dozen departments. John was one of the initial appointments, and for the next twenty-five years his expertise in both ancient philosophy and ancient history was invaluable. He could turn his mind anywhere in those fields. Plato and Aristotle he always taught, with particular interest in politics; Greek History when it was needed, until at a later stage we had a specialist Greek historian; in Roman History, he developed an interest in the later period, which strengthened our contacts with other departments such as History and Religious Studies. The Classics staff grew to eight. John had the widest interests and knowledge of us all, and thus was the stable centre of the department, familiar with the special fields of most of his colleagues. He himself published little; there was the occasional review, and eventually an edition of Lactantius' *De Mortibus Persecutorum*, arising from his interests in late history and religion. He was in fact an example of the old-fashioned classical teacher, broadly educated, deeply cultured, dedicated to his students and his subject, not particularly concerned about publication – a type disregarded and undervalued in the present climate of research grading and 'bibliometry'. In the early 1970s he was promoted to a Senior Lectureship.

His position in Lancaster University was unique. He held nearly every office in the place at different times: Principal of one of the Colleges, Head of the Classics Department, Chairman of the Board of Studies, finally he was given the created title 'Provost of Colleges'; he was on all important committees and courts of enquiry, including the ones set up after the student unrest and occupation of 1975. He was liked and trusted by everyone. At his funeral service in the University's 'Chaplaincy Centre' there was standing room only, with the widest representation of all parts of the organisation, every academic area as well as the administration.

After the friendly, intellectual, 'Johnian' atmosphere of the department at Reading, Lancaster brought some change. He entered into local politics. With his wife Jean and their four children he made his home a centre of happiness and hospitality for both town and university friends. Within the Department of Classics, as in the whole University, he combined firm standards of right and wrong with an understanding tolerance, which meant that he never quarrelled with anyone. During fifteen years of the closest collaboration, I remember no tensions or misunderstandings. During his last two years the Department, now of Classics and Archaeology, was closed, and colleagues departed for other universities. Only John and David Shotter remained, David to join the History Department, John to share his teaching between Philosophy and History, as always. He was warmly welcomed by his new colleagues. As an obituary in the local news sheet put it, he embodied the ideals of the University.

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Review **C.J.Tuplin** (Liverpool)

LCM 15.8 (Oct 1990), 123-128

H.D. Westlake, *Studies in Thucydides and Greek History*. Bristol Classical Press, 1989. Pp.viii + 310. £9.95 Pbk.. ISBN 1-85399-041-8

I. Twenty years have passed since the appearance of Westlake's *Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History* (Manchester 1969). During most of them W. has been enjoying a productive retirement from the Chair of Greek in the University of Manchester, and the fruits can now be sampled in this new collection of *Kleine Schriften*. One item ('Personal motives, aims and feelings in Thucydides', pp.201-223) is new, but the remaining eighteen represent a selection of around two thirds of the articles published by W. in the period. Their texts have been entirely reset, not merely reproduced photographically, so we do not have to tolerate a volume with a disconcerting mixture of type faces. We do, however, have to accept footnotes relegated to the end of each chapter. And it is a little odd that the opportunity has not been taken to gloss cross-references to other articles in the collection with the pagination of the present volume (especially since the list of contents, while identifying the location and date of the first publication, does not reveal its pagination). This is taking an entirely reasonable decision not to embark on any substantive revision of the originals to unnecessary lengths. The index is rather sketchy.

None of the places of original publication is at all obscure – the *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* (a notable Manchester institution) is the only one which could be called marginal to the ordinary periodical-reading habits of ancient historians and classicists – so the rationale of republication is not the difficulty of access of any of the material but consists rather in two other motives: a desire to pay due acknowledgement to W.'s continuing services to the study of classical history and a wish to offer readers the convenience of having a good deal of material together in one place on their own shelves rather than scattered about those of their university library.

No fair-minded observer should deny the force of the first motive. The firm grounding of W.'s work in ancient texts and in careful reading of what they actually say are characteristics which ensure that perusal of his writings can never be a waste of time (*nothing* which makes one re-read the sources can ever be a waste of time) and the sobriety of his scholarship ensures that it can never do any harm. That may sound like patronising praise of a rather negative virtue. It is assuredly not intended to be anything of the sort. Quite apart from the fact that to be rudely dismissive would be a deplorable recompense for W.'s unfailing courtesy in the conduct of scholarly argument, it would also simply be wrong. It is only too easy for historiographical scholarship in particular to create unbalanced perspectives and thereby run the risk of misdirecting subsequent study. There is doubtless a place for such brinkmanship, but there is no shame in the other approach, and much benefit too to any reader whose taste has not been corrupted by the desire for intellectual titillation at any cost.

The reverse of the coin, of course, is that the second motive for republication may strike some as relatively weak. Just because W. has always sought to avoid complexity, his articles tend to be ones which, once read attentively, do not need to be frequently re-read or re-consulted on points of detail. Their arguments are sparsely displayed, easy to assimilate, and straightforward to incorporate into one's notes, and the practical value of republication will therefore be relatively small for those students of Thucydides and of the years 431-395 who have been keeping up with W.'s work over the past two decades. Things will be different, however, for other consumers, e.g. those with a broader interest in historiography, for whom keeping up with Thucydidean bibliography is only part of their burden; those who have to teach the period but do not do their primary research in it; and undergraduates who, if their university library buys the volume, will have access to additional copies of articles on their reading lists. All such people have cause to thank Bristol Classical Press for making life just a little bit easier, though they will probably all wish that the collection were even more comprehensive. (The historiographers in particular, for whom speeches are an abiding, if tantalising, subject of interest, will note the absence of two relevant items in *GRBS* 12 [1971], 497-503, and in P.A.Stadter (ed.), *The Speeches in Thucydides* [North Carolina UP 1973].

II. The contents fall into two obvious groups, viz. fourteen items on Thucydides and the history of the Peloponnesian War and five on events in the fifteen years after Thucydides' *History* breaks off, and are arranged in chronological orders of their (principal) subject matter. The first chapter is thus the important article in *CQ* 27 (1977), 95-110, which seeks to show that Thucydides used a written source for the excursus on Pausanias and Themistocles, while the last contemplates the final five years of Tissaphernes' life (= *Historia* 30 [1981], 257-79). Its conclusion is that Artaxerxes provisionally planned to dispose of Tissaphernes as early as winter 396/5, well before the Battle of Sardis, that the method of disposal (arrest by trickery and decapitation) indicates that '[Tissaphernes] was guilty of disloyalty, though any plans for rebellion . . . can hardly have reached an advanced stage' (302), and that he paid the penalty of 'his own defects, notably a determination to impose his will on others combined with a lack of judgement in failing to appreciate how much his high-handed and deceitful treatment of them might damage his own interests' (289). Trying to understand Tissaphernes is not, as Thucydides knew, a relaxing pastime.

But I should prefer to put the matter as follows.

(i) Tissaphernes did nothing useful to counter the Spartan invasion of western Anatolia, and this was probably a mixture of incompetence, indolence and a willingness (arising from personal enmity) to look complaisantly upon the Spartans so long as they harmed Pharnabazus.

(ii) He nonetheless retained Artaxerxes' favour (initially secured by his services against Cyrus) much longer than one might have expected and it is even possible that his designation as *στρατηγός τῶν πάντων* came as late as 398/7: cf. C.J.Tuplin, 'The Treaty of Boiotios' in H.M.Sancisi-Weerdenburg & A.T.Kuhrt, *Achaemenid History II: The Greek Sources* (Leiden 1987), 133-53, at 149, where it is argued that linguistic considerations favour this interpretation of Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.13, however 'quixotic' (W.'s word) it seems to make the Great King's behaviour. The whole point about the situation may be precisely that Artaxerxes' reaction to *Pharnabazus*' calls for more energetic resistance and for the implementation of a new complementary strategy (naval counter-offensive) was to elevate *Tissaphernes* to higher rank.

(iii) The result of this over-prolonged trust was that, when Artaxerxes did eventually turn (or was turned) against Tissaphernes, it was easy to convince him that he was ungrateful as well as ineffective, that he must be motivated by disloyalty and that he couldn't be demoted again (as he had been in 408/7) without provoking trouble, especially since, by contrast with 408/7, there was now no prince of the blood royal available whose appointment as a replacement he might choose to construe as other than a personal slight. (Not that, in the long run, he had so construed it on the previous occasion, as is shown by his denunciation of Cyrus in 404 and the conflict between them over the Ionian cities in 403-401. The latter must have been much discussed in 396/5. Artaxerxes had tolerated the situation at the time, because he did at least get tribute from the Greek cities. Now there was the prospect of more conflict between Persian grandees in western Anatolia, but this time without either of the parties being in control of, or able to forward the tribute from, the coastal fringe.)

The purely chronological arrangement of subject matter is a perfectly natural way of organising the volume. But there might have been something to be said for putting the articles in order of original publication, since this would draw attention to certain patterns in W.'s work over the last two decades – especially given that, although these patterns are to some degree also reflected in items not reprinted here, the selection made for the present volume tends to heighten the effect and is presumably to some extent consciously dictated by it.

In fact, there is perhaps only one thematically isolated item in the collection, viz. 3 (= *CQ* 33 [1983], 12-24), a survey of *ἐπιτειχισμός* stretching from the late sixth to the mid fourth century. (In view of the stress on the way that use of this strategy in the Peloponnesian War was based on earlier examples of 'internal' *ἐπιτειχισμός*, i.e. the operations of exiles or dissidents from strongholds in the city's *χωρά*, it is peculiar that W. does not underline the point that Pylos was actually, in view of the Messenian angle, a mixture of 'internal' and 'external' *ἐπιτειχισμός*).

More characteristic of the way that W. seems to have moved from subject to subject are the two earliest items reprinted here, which appears separated by four disparate chapters, but when put together can be seen as complementary. 2(= *BJRL* 53 [1970]) argues that, whereas in 1-4 Thucydides tends to see diplomacy in terms of open debate, often represented by pairs of speeches, in books 5 and 8 he is more interested in secret negotiations and in 6 and 7 we find both. 7(= *CQ* 21 [1971], 315-25) maintains that much of the obscurity of 5.25-116 is a deliberate result of Thucydides' desire to draw attention to the amount of (often secret) diplomatic jockeying for position that was going on and to the incompetence and political bankruptcy of those involved. It is quite clear how the second study arises out of the overall analysis undertaken in the first. Moreover, insofar as both have a bearing upon the history of composition of the *History* (7 is, *inter alia*, trying to show that book 5 is not quite as 'alien' to the rest of the work as is sometimes thought), it is appropriate that the next item published was 8(= *Phoenix* 26 [1972], 12-17), a piece of pure *Kompositionsgeschichte*. This argues that there are two distinct second prefaces in 5.25 & 26 which 'introduce different but overlapping periods . . . are written from different points of view and with different aims . . . [and] display discrepancies . . . the most substantial being that, whereas 25.1 states that there was peace for a time for cities accepting the terms of the treaty, 26.2 denies that there was any tangible interruption of the war' (99). The second was composed much later, after 404, and in a finally revised text both could not properly have stood together.

I find the argument pretty unconvincing, for the postulated inconcinnity is simply, to my mind, not there (the highlighted contrast between 25.1 and 26.2 in particular is surely unreal; after all, 25.1 does also make clear that there were those who did not accept the treaty!). But the article is nonetheless valuable, an excellent example of the heuristic worth of incorrect argument. Few readers of 5.25-6 can have failed to experience a vague feeling that Thucydides here takes two bites at the cherry, with a sort of fresh start at 26.1. W.'s article amounts to an attempt to discover whether this feeling corresponds to anything more substantial than a quirk in the arrangement of Thucydides' argument and, for me, succeeds in proving that it does not.

The next distinctive block of publications is a series of articles from the mid 1970s which deal with particular incidents in Thucydides and which raise the issue of the accuracy of his record, often as compared with evidence from other sources. 13(= *BJRL* 56 [1973], 193-218) starts from the disagreements of fact and sympathy between Thucydides and *Ath. Pol.* on the history of the 400 and concludes, with some reason, that the historian's attitude is, if not prejudiced, at least lacking in nuance and subjectively hostile, despite the strange amount of praise for the individual cleverness of men whose revolution, once consummated, lasted only four months. 5(= *CQ* 24 [1974], 211-26) suggests that Thucydides was overinclined to think that the abortive Spartan peace embassy in 425 was caused by the magnitude of her naval defeat at Pylos. In fact most Spartan ships survived the battle and, according to W., the reverse was simply the occasion for pursuit of negotiations already favoured in some quarters. Here, I think, W. may simply underestimate (though he does not fail to mention) the psychological effects of the battle. Always inclined to feel at a disadvantage in any maritime conflict with Athens, the Spartans were too appalled by the fact that their men were suddenly trapped on Sphacteria to be likely to consider dispassionately the possibilities of a sea-borne rescue attempt; and the other indications cited on p.71 that Sparta was in a mood to end the war in 426-5 are, as W. says, scarcely conclusive. Of course, her willingness to negotiate at all does demonstrate that those in a position to influence Spartan foreign policy were not driven by a passionate conviction that, come what may, the war had to be pursued to the bitter end, but we should need to be better informed about the demography of 420s Sparta and the objective significance of the prospective loss of all the Spartiates on the island to be able to draw a more discriminating conclusion.

4(= *Phoenix* 29 [1975], 107-116) proposes that the reason for Paches' sudden disappearance from the record after the recovery of Lesbos was that he was punished for his failure to destroy the fleet of Alcidas, his self-justificatory thoughts on the topic in 3.33.3 being known to Thucydides from an unsuccessful court-room *apologia*. The alternative

explanation, provided by later sources, that he committed suicide when prosecuted for immoral treatment of two Mytilenean women, is dismissed as arising from misunderstanding of something in a contemporary comedy. On reconsideration I find this somewhat more convincing than I did in *GRBS* 32 (1982), 325-330, and it perhaps makes relatively little difference to the argument of that paper: for if Paches' fate was capable of inspiring a comic treatment which could give rise to the dramatic tale known to Plutarch and Agathias, it was arguably capable of providing the background to a joke about his son in *Ecclesiazousae* 644. (The Mytilenean revolt reappears in another contemporary article not reproduced here, 'The Commons at Mytilene', *Historia* 25 [1976], 429-40.) Finally 9 (= *Phoenix* 31 [1977], 319-29) compares Andocides' assertion that Athens gratuitously forfeited the good will of Darius II by supporting Amorgos with the (patchy) Thucydidean evidence and concludes (with more dependence than is comfortable on the argument from silence) that the orator was wrong, while 1 (= *CQ* 27 [1977], 95-110) develops the thesis of a written source for the Pausanias/Themistocles excursus as (in part) an explanation for a narrative which provokes exceptional scepticism. The thesis is seductive, but as an explanation it seems to move the goalposts rather than cancel the game. (Note that 'λέγεται in Thucydides', *Mnem.* 30 [1977], 345-62, not reprinted here, is a contemporary companion piece to part of the linguistic argument.)

These last two items also herald the appearance of an interest in Ionia and Persia which has occupied W. repeatedly over the last ten years and is represented here by five items. (Others can be found in *Mus. Helv.* 440 [1983], 239-50, *GRBS* 24 [1983], 333-44 and *GRBS* 27 [1986], 266-77.)

After the excellent article on Ionians in the Ionian War (10 = *CQ* 29 [1979], 9-44) and that on the fall of Tissaphernes already mentioned above (p.124), come a pair dealing with the treatment of Alcibiades and Tissaphernes in Thucydides 8 (11 = *Mnem.* 38 [1985], 92-108; 12 = *CQ* 35 [1985], 43-54). As elsewhere (see further below) W. is interested in the origins of Thucydides' material, and he argues that (i) Alcibiades was not personally a source for the historian, though some close associate of his was (at least for the time spent at Sardis), (ii) this source was also responsible for the strand in the treatment of Tissaphernes which represents him in a favourable light as a cool and calculating statesman and (iii) there is, however, another hostile and indeed inconsistent strand in the portrayal of the satrap, which derived from disenchanted informants in the Peloponnesian camp (perhaps including Hermocrates of Syracuse).

W. is probably right about Alcibiades, though I find it more surprising than he does that Thucydides, whose actual source was allegedly an Athenian exile in Alcibiades' entourage, does not draw even the slightest attention to the existence of such an entourage at Sardis. W.'s idea is that we are dealing with *inter alios* other Athenian exiles, men who did not feel it safe to accompany Alcibiades when he eventually returned to the Athenian camp (with the result that the quality of information about him then declines) and one cannot help feeling that this lack of confidence is actually a matter of historical interest in its own right: to put the matter concretely, would it not have been worth pointing out in 8.80 that the assurances given to Alcibiades when he was invited to Samos were not extended to his associates? As for Tissaphernes, though it is clearly likely that different people could view him in different ways, I feel fairly sure that W. exaggerates the degree of actual inconsistency: after all, the mixture of what passes for intelligent planning with a disposition to indolence and highhandedness seems recognisably similar to the impression created by Xenophon (cf. above p.124). But this is a matter I hope to pursue further elsewhere.

The Ionian/Persian interest continues with 16 (= *Hist.* 35 [1986], 405-26), a survey of the Spartan campaign in Asia Minor which gently questions Xenophon's estimation of the relative merits of Thibron and Dercyllidas, and 17 (= *Phoenix* 41 [1987], 241-54), where the suggestion is advanced that the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* is the proximate source of the Ephoran account of the anabasis of Cyrus and that the Oxyrhynchus historian's proximate source was personal contact with a survivor rather than a written account. The first proposition is not, of course, particularly startling. The second one initially seems more so but reflection suggests no good reason why this should be so – and it should be added that the question of whether

Sophaenetes' *Anabasis* (F.Gr.H. 109) is a late (post-Plutarchan) forgery is strictly irrelevant, for even if it was not, we do not have to assume that the Oxyrhynchus historian read it.

The interest in Diodorus' alternative to the Xenophontic *Anabasis* is, of course, of a piece with the general recent trend in study of the period 411-362, and this trend is further represented here by two articles from 1985 dealing with battle narratives, Abydos and Byzantium in 15 (= *Mus.Helv.* 42 [1985], 313-327) and Haliartus in 18 (= *Phoenix* 39 [1985], 119-133). It will be seen from C.J.Tuplin, 'Military engagements in Xenophon's *Hellenica*', in I.S.Moxon, J.D.Smart & A.J.Woodman, eds., *Past Perspectives* (Cambridge 1986), that I am more in sympathy with W. in this latter case than in the former.

It remains to comment on the one previously unpublished item (chapter 16). In general terms this may be set alongside W.'s persistent interest in speculating about the visible effects upon Thucydides' narrative of the sources with which he had to work. More specifically it concerns itself with the various ways in which the historian might come to feel entitled to make explicit assertions about the motives, intentions and sentiments of individual actors in the historical drama, and it represents a systematic investigation of the types of question raised about Brasidas in 6 (= *GRBS* 21 [1980], 333-9) and Alcibiades and Tissaphernes in 11 and 12 (above), not to mention *Individuals in Thucydides* (Cambridge 1968).

The procedure is to postulate that, while some attributions of motives depend upon inference either from the public behaviour or expected attitudes of the individual or from the historian's general interpretation of his character, there are others which are based upon direct information from the individual or from a close associate and which can be tentatively identified by applying certain criteria, notably that the attributed motives etc. (i) represent unfulfilled intentions or are predicated upon what turned out to be incorrect assumptions, (ii) could not have been widely known or (iii) are in conflict with the views expressed openly by the same individual in the same context (the last is, of course, just a special case of [ii]). It is also further hinted that, granted the existence of cases of this last sort and granted further that Thucydides does not scatter attributions of personal views around the *History* arbitrarily, it is likely that there are actually many more examples of the historian's direct access to personal information than can now be demonstrably recognised.

In many cases, however, it proves hard to share even the modest confidence that W. feels in making the relevant identifications. The various calculations attributed to Aristeus in 1.62.3, 63.1, 65.1 and to Brasidas in 4.70.1, 73.1-2, 120.2, 124.4 and 5.82.3 are surely all deducible from public events (in some cases the dispositions made for battle!) and/or known to more than a narrow circle of associates. Gylippus' attempt to save Nicias and Demosthenes from execution (7.86.4) was part of a public debate in Syracuse, and I should have thought that virtually every member of the audience will have correctly concluded that, as Thucydides says, Gylippus liked the idea of being able to display his prisoners before the citizen assembly of Sparta: we are, after all, speaking of a culture dominated by *φιλοτιμία*. Similarly, in the light of his earlier opposition to the whole enterprise, Nicias' insistence that the armament sent against Syracuse be very large could only be interpreted by those present as a way of ensuring either that the Athenians abandoned the plan or that its execution was as safe as possible (6.24.1).

The same goes for his motives for despatching a letter at 7.8.2-3. What other explanation could there be? As for 7.48-49, which W. regards as a particularly clear indication that 'Thucydides had obtained information from a close associate of a leading figure' (212), everything here seems to me capable of being put together on the basis of reports from almost anyone present at what was (7.48.1) a well-attended meeting. Note in particular that the whole suggestion that there was a fifth column in Syracuse is not something known only to Nicias – even if he does not mention it openly on this occasion, comparison with 7.73.3, 86.4 shows at the very least that it was something Thucydides heard about from Athenian and from Syracusan sources – and that Nicias actually shared some of the feelings of despondency characteristic of his fellow-generals will have been readily deduced from his concern to argue that the Syracusans' situation was 'even worse than our own' (48.5). The observation that he had not really quite decided what to do but spoke publicly against withdrawal is of a piece with the

historian's later comment (49.4) that there began to be *ἄκνος τις καὶ μέλλησις* because Nicias, alone of the generals, opposed withdrawal – and this latter I take to represent information given to Thucydides about the mood in the Athenian camp from this time on, a mood predicated upon the conviction that, although Nicias had said no to withdrawal and although, constitutionally, this apparently decided the issue, the decision was nonetheless really only temporary. Because two of the generals and (I imagine) most of the army wanted to pull out, they were inclined to see the failure to do so as merely a delay in achieving their desire not a definitive decision. Perhaps Nicias' publicly visible manner justifiably encouraged them to think that he felt the same (his particular stress on fear for his own safety at the hands of the *demos*, should he be thought to have withdrawn prematurely, might well have encouraged such a deduction). Perhaps it was simply wishful thinking. Either way, I do not see that we *need* to postulate a source specially privy to Nicias' feelings in order to explain Thucydides' narrative.

In fact, the only cases in which I experience much instinctive sympathy with W.'s treatment are ones which have long attracted attention in this context, viz. Alcibiades (pp.215f.: Ionian War contexts only) – it is not surprising that the specific thesis of Alcibiades being a Thucydidean source has had such a long history – and *perhaps* Demosthenes (in books 3 and 4 only); and even in the latter case it would not be because any of the relevant passages is a particularly convincing case in itself (merely for the sake of example I note that Demosthenes' failure to return home in 3.98.5 would be bound to be interpreted, as Thucydides does interpret it, as due to apprehension of punishment, and that the unfulfilled plan to attack Ambracia in 3.113.6 is attributed to 'the Athenians and Demosthenes', the implication of which is surely that the historian could have heard of it from any number of people) but because there are so many of them.

Naturally, there may be all the difference in the world between what can be demonstrated and what may actually have been the case. Thucydides may sometimes have been able to get confirmation from the horse's mouth of assertions or deductions already received from third parties. But it is not, of course, in his manner to draw attention to such instances, since his general approach is to conceal the *process* of source-gathering and evaluation behind the concise observation that it was not easy but he did it as well as he could, and we cannot realistically expect to out-guess him very often, if at all. In short, my reaction is similar to that about 8 (above p.125): W. has tried an experiment which largely fails, but in failing provides some more solid confirmation for what would have been most readers' previous feeling on the matter.

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'Rückkehr des  
Alkibiades  
nach Athen'.  
Zeichnung von  
H. Vogel  
in W.Wagner,  
*Hellas. Das Land  
und Volk der alten  
Griechen*, 6th ed.  
neu bearbeitet unter  
Mitwirkung von  
Dr.H Dittmar, 2vv.  
Leipzig & Berlin  
1886, 2, p.53.

